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Abstract  
Unlike conventional banks, whose main goal is maximizing profit based on loans, 
Islamic banks comply with the Islamic law (Shariah), which strictly prohibits the use 
of interest. Because of this is precise characteristic of Islamic banks, many were 
skeptical when the first Islamic banks were established, considering that interest-free 
banking can’t survive. Despite this skepticism, Islamic banks are one of the fastest 
growing financial industries. Interest-free banking doesn’t meanbanking without 
profit, but a more stable and secure ethical alternative, because instead of interest, 
Islamic banks receive fees and commissions for their services, participate in a 
profit(loss)-sharing with their clients and they are protected with contracts. The 
purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the similarities and differences 
                                                 
1 This paper was created as part of the projects of University of Rijeka:  
- Tax System and Socioeconomic Relations of the Croatian Society, no. 13.02.1.2.02.  
- Concepts and methods of cost and management accounting in the public sector of Croatia, no. 13.02.1.2.09. 
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between conventional and Islamic banks and draw conclusions about the stability and 
efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks before, during and after the crisis. In 
obtaining these results, special attention was given to the phenomenon of the banking 
sector regulation, highlighting the advantages of regulation over Adam Smith̕̕ s 
"invisible hand" as one of the key reasons for the last economic crisis. From the 
example of conventional and Islamic banks, it becomes clear that any regulation 
policy needs to be carefully adapted to the specific conditions of individual industries, 
and that the same basic principles and uniform legal solutions for all market 
participants will not achieve desired results, as pointed out by the Nobel laureate, 
Jean Tirole. 
Keywords: Conventional vs Islamic banks, financial crisis, regulations, efficiency, 
stability. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Banks whose primary goal is to maximize profits represent the most 
significant financial institutions in most countries. Unlike this fact which refers to 
conventional banks (hereafter CBs), Islamic banks (hereafter IBs) are trying to be 
socially responsible while operating in accordance with religious principles, 
prohibiting the use of interest and following the model of profit and loss sharing with 
their clients. Despite its relatively short history compared to CBs, IBs and Islamic 
finance in general represent one of the fastest growing financial industries. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 had a global impact on banking 
institutions; therefore this research focuses on the effect of the financial crisis on CBs 
and IBs’ financial stability and efficiency, with a special emphasis on the importance 
of regulation in the banking sector, which is also described by Jean Tirole, an 
economist and a Nobel Prize winner. It is becoming clear that bank regulatory 
measures should be in alliance with banking principles conditioned by economic, 
institutional and cultural environment. 
Considering the differences in business operations between CBs and IBs, as 
well as the difference in the approach to regulation between the stated banks, which 
exist only due to the principles according to which they operate, the focus of this 
research paper is on the differences in the operations of these banks as well as on the 
impact of these differences on the stability and efficiency of CBs and IBs. In this 
regard, the objective of the paper is to analyze CBs and IBs’ characteristics, explore 
the differences and similarities in their business, provide an overview of empirical 
studies on the stability and efficiency of these banks prior to, during and after the last 
financial crisis, and finally, to draw conclusions about the impact of CBs and IBs’ 
specific characteristics of business on the stability and efficiency of these banks. 
 
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING 
Further in the paper, the development of conventional and Islamic banking is 
described. Even though in its early forms conventional banking is over 5000 years 
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older than Islamic, analyzing their intense development, it is noticeable that 
conventional banking has a kind of historical advantage of about 500 years. 
 
2.1. Development of Conventional Banks 
The first precursors of banks can be traced back to ancient times (the Middle 
East, Greece, Rome), with the emergence of exchange of goods in the areas rich in 
natural resources. In the period from 3400 to 3200 BC in the Middle East, the 
appearance of banks was related to religious beliefs, thus the temples were bank 
founders. After Hammurabi’s Code on the Banks from 2500 BC, the banking changes 
from a religious to a commercial activity, it is taken out of the temples and the real 
banking industry begins. Still, the banks as we know themdevelop only with the 
emergence of money. The first beginnings of banking similar to modern conventional 
banking were seen in Italy, in the region of Lombardy, while Casa di San Giorgio in 
Genoa is considered the first bank and was established in 1407.   
Interestingly, following the development of banks in Italy in the 15th century, 
Benedikt Kotruljević from Dubrovnik, in his book “On Trade and the Perfect 
Merchant” from 1458 (published in Venice in 1573), besides trading, merchants, 
market, monetary and commercial ethics, writes about banking instruments, credit 
loans and interest rates (Cerović, et al., 2012,  p. 37). In his book, Kotruljević 
describes bankers as merchants rather than moneylenders, because according to him, 
loans were considered support for which commission was paid, not interest, and if 
there is no interest, there is no usury (Perišin, 1996, p. 102).  
The development of banking through history was largely influenced by the 
growing human needs in the fields of production and trade. The increasing 
concentration of capital in production and trade resulted in an increasing 
concentration of capital in banking. Various economic and political conditions led to 
new processes in banking as we know it today, so the period between the 19th century 
and the 1st World War is characterized by the process of concentration of banks. The 
period between the 1st and the 2nd World War is characterized by bank specialization, 
whereas the development of modern banking is seen through the process of 
globalization.According to Nikolić and Pečarić (2007, p. 198), this globalization 
process initiated de-specialization of banking operations whose goal is to create a 
bank as a universal financial institution which offers all services. The de-
specialization process is a precondition for their survival in the globalized financial 
market and a way to fight off stiff competition from non-bank institutions. 
 
2.2. Development of Islamic Banks 
The establishment of the first interest-free bank in Egypt in 1963 is 
considered the official beginning of Islamic banking (Ahmad, 2014, p. 158; Hadžić, 
2005, p. 18). In 1974, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) founded an IB 
called Islamic Development Bank (IDB), whose goal was to promote economic 
development in Muslim countries and providing the funds for the development in 
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accordance with the rules of Sharia2. By the end of 1970s, several banking systems 
were founded in the Muslim world; first private commercial bank in Dubai in 1975, in 
Sudan (FaisalIslamicBank ofSudan) in 1977 and in Bahrain (Bahrain Islamic bank) in 
1979 (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, The Islamic Banker).  
In the early stages of growth of theIslamic financial market in the 1980s, IBs 
were faced with the lack of quality investment opportunities, which enabled CBs from 
the West to become mediators in utilizing the funds of IBs. Therefore, Western banks 
helped IBs to direct the funds in business and trade-related activities, by agreeing that 
a merchant buys goods on behalf of an IB and sells them at an interest rate margin. 
Western banks noticed the significance of Islamic financial markets and started to 
offer Islamic financial products through so called Islamic windows3, attracting the 
clients directly, without IBs’ mediation. 
Today the world counts over 300 IBs in more than 70 countries, and except 
in Muslim countries they can be found in the following parts of the world: Australia, 
the Bahamas, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, the USA, 
Switzerland, the UK, as well as Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only 
Southeast Europe countries in which there arebanks that operate on Islamic financial 
principles (Hadžić, 2005, p. 25).  
It should be noted that in Muslim countries today there are dual banking 
systems, i. e. the systems that comprise of both CB and IB. The example of the first 
country with a dual banking system is the United Arab Emirates, where the bank was 
established in Dubai in 1973 (Dubai Islamic Bank), that resembled the conventional 
commercial bank in the way it operated, but without paying and receiving interests 
(El Massah and Al-Sayed, 2015, p. 69). 
 
3. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS, SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND 
CONVENTIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 
The origins of Islam and its prophet Muhammad laid a foundation for the 
Islamic financial system. It is built on religious principles and laws (Sharia) which 
imply that trade is allowed by Allah, who prohibits usury and the existence of 
interests (riba) as a safe, predetermined and fixed income. Therefore, Islamic banking 
is based on an agreement between the bank and its clients about profit and loss 
sharing.      
                                                 
2 Islamic religious law 
3Islamic windows are not independent financial institutions, but specialized departments within conventional 
financial institutions, offering their clients the products that comply with Islamic Sharia Law. Due to the 
growing demand for Sharia-compliant products and the fear of losing clients, non-western CBs started to 
offer Islamic windows as well.  
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In Islamic banking, money represents potential capital until it is invested and 
united with human work through business activities of production, trade and services 
based on moral, ethical and religious principles (Čočić, 2012, p. 215). 
According to Hadžić (2005, p. 51), Islamic ideology defines (criticizes) 
lending of the money at an interest rate as a way for the rich (those who have the 
capital) to make profit without giving anything in return for the income (interest) they 
receive. This Islamic approach to interest resembles the approach of ancient 
philosophers (Aristotle) and classical economists (Adam Smith)4. Islamic teachings 
indicate that interest discourages people from production and mutual exchange of 
manufactured goods. If the interest is forbidden, it is considered that individuals 
borrow to each other with pleasure and thus do good deeds not only to others, but to 
themselves as well. According to Islam, the interest slows down the process of 
investment, and consequently, economic and overall social development. In Islamic 
banking, the risk is shared between the bank and the capital user.The bank is directly 
interested in the success of a client and participates actively in managing a future 
company. With such a utilization of funds, it can generate greater profits than from 
interest income;nevertheless, risk exposure is higher. 
Imam and Kpodar (2010, p. 4) argue that, along with the prohibition of 
interest (riba), operations of an IB should abide by other restrictions of Islamic law as 
well: 
 the prohibition of activities that generate asymmetric information, hence 
encouraging excessive uncertainty, i. e. financial uncertainty (gharar),  
 the prohibition of speculative activities (maysir), 
 the prohibition of activities that negatively impact the society (haram). 
Considering those religious principles by which IBs operate, western 
analysts were skeptical about the establishment of first IBs, as they believed the 
absence of interest in the banking system would disable bank operations, arguing that 
interest-free banking implies (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2009, p. 16):  
 unlimited demand for available funds and the lack of supply, 
 the lack of savings, 
 unrealized investments and growth, 
 the failure of monetary policy, because no instrument of liquidity 
management could exist without a fixed, predetermined interest rate, and 
                                                 
4In addition to the prohibition of interest, financial justice is considered the central concept of Islamic 
banking, which Subbarao (2009) associates with liberal views of Adam Smith, who fought against state 
control, trade monopoly and advocated a free market (Hasan and Dridi, 2010, p. 7-8). As Smith sees it, in 
order to maximize profit, an entrepreneur invests their capital where they realize the highest production and 
thus becomes driven by “an invisible hand”. Furthermore, he considers the wealth is not just the invested 
money, but also useful work which creates value. This can be compared to IBs that invest (lend) their capital 
with a goal of maximizing profit and share both profit and risk with the debtor, and since there is no interest, 
they comply with the principles of ethical business (lending to individuals without interest rates results in 
collective well-being). 
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 one-way “escape” of capital. 
Based on the above, the question is how Islamic financial system and IBs 
can perform banking operations like CBs, and what services (financial arrangements) 
they offer to their clients. Despite the interest-free principle, IBs have the right to 
charge a fee and a commission for the work done. Furthermore, they protect their 
business on the basis of clearly defined contracts that will be explained below.  
As Antić illustrates (2008, p. 64), the forms of financial arrangements in the 
Islamic financial system, on which business relations are based, can be divided into:  
 Mudarabah (agent arrangement) – acontractual agreement between at least 
two parties in which one contracting partyis a financier of the other party – 
theentrepreneur, where the profits are shared according to pre-agreed terms, 
while the losses are borne by the financier of the project. 
 Musharakah (joint venture) – a contractual agreement where two or more 
parties, that want to become partners in a business endeavor, contribute 
financial resources and thus gain the right of profit sharing in any ratio 
agreed, while losses are shared in proportion to respective contribution to 
capital. 
 Murabaha (cost plus financing) – a purchase from a financier on a deferred 
payment basis; the bank purchases goods for the client and gives it to their 
use, binding them to repay the purchase cost plus an agreed profit margin in 
more instalments. 
 Qard Hassan (benevolent loans) –crediting without contractual fees. 
 Ijara, Ijara wa-Iqtina (lease arrangements) – correspond to operational and 
financial leasing in conventional financial systems. 
 Istisna' (concession agreement) –a model suitable for long-term financing of 
the acquisition of capital goods. 
Among the aforementioned financial arrangements, Mudarabah and 
Musharakah represent the two fundamental forms upon which Islamic financeis 
based, which makes them the most common in Islamic banking. 
The main difference between CBs and IBs can be seen in risk sharing and 
the prohibition of interest. Those are the basic characteristics of Islamic banking, 
while conventional banks, with the use of interest and various instruments to insure 
loan repayments, protect themselves against the risk of capital investments. In this 
way, CBs entirely transfer the risk to the debtor, thus becoming uninterested in the 
client’s business success. Clients’ deposits in IBs are considered safer because, since 
only successful investments bring them profit, IBs will not invest into uncertain 
projects. Therefore, IBs are investment-oriented (most products carry this feature) and 
concerned for the client’s success (as banks share the same “destiny” with clients). In 
addition, IBs are considered socially more responsible than CBs (they do not finance 
the industry of alcohol, tobacco, prostitution, pornography, gamble, military) and 
religiously-bound (within the limits of their power, they help clients who are in 
trouble against their will). 
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On the other hand, IBs(Bosna Bank International) offer its customers 
different products and services such as those inCBs: 
 the use of interest-free credit cards,  for which a person pays a one-time fee 
(which includes the costs of the bank), 
 fixed-term savings for which clients do not receive interest, but a certain 
income as a joint venture of a bank and a client (halal5income), 
 an overdraft on a current account for which a client does not pay interest, but 
a fixed commission predetermined by the bank. 
With regard to the abovementioned, one can conclude that in Islamic 
banking, commissions and various fees for bank services are allowed, as they are not 
considered the interest, which is forbidden by Islam. This answers the most common 
questions about the making of the profit and IBs’ survival given the lack of interest, 
because interest-free banking is not banking without profit, but a stable and secure 
ethical alternative. Moreover, IBs are protected with clearly defined agreements 
signed with their clients, so if they finance the purchase of an apartment for a client, 
IB becomes a partner; i. e. it requires a minimum share in the property, protecting 
themselves against client’s non-payment. It should be pointed out that IBs’ products 
are not necessarily cheaper than CBs’ regardless of the lack of interest, because in 
such cases banks are protected by contacts, fees and commissions paid by the clients. 
 
4. CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC BANKS BEFORE, 
DURING AND AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Following, the paper brings an overview of CBs and IBs’ operations from 
the perspective of their financial stability and efficiency. Then, in the context of the 
analysis of market power in the banking sector, it explains the relationship between 
the regulation and the financial crisis in the banking sector, and considers the impact 
of regulation on CBs and IBs’ operations. 
 
4.1. Operations of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
Today, when there are numerous financing resources, which limits the 
competition between banks, Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing industries in 
the world. In the report by Ernst &Young (2012) on the competitiveness of Islamic 
banking in the world, the assets of IB in 2011 were estimated at $1.3 trillion and it 
recorded growth despite the financial crisis. During this period, in the Islamic 
countries, IBs recorded 50% faster growth than CBs. According to data from 2014, 
Abedifar et al. (2015, p. 2) state that the assets of Islamic finance are estimated at $2 
trillion, 80% of which belongs to IBs (or Islamic windows). In the period from 2009 
to 2013, IBs’ assets grew at a rate of 17.6%, andby 2018 the expected growth rateis 
19.7% (The Economist, 2014). 
                                                 
5 Clean, allowed by Islam 
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Although the data refer to 31st December 2015 and are expressed in €, and thus are 
not fully comparable to those referring to IBs, it is interesting to add that the assets of 
the largest (conventional) European bank (HSBC Holdings, UK) are estimated at 
€2,18 trillion, the assets of the TOP 10 European banks at €15,06 trillion, while the 
assets of the TOP 50 European banks are worth as much as €29,99 trillion. Out of the 
50 largest banks, as many as 7 are from Germany, while 6 are from France, Spain and 
the UK respectively (HSBC, 2016). 
 
4.1.1. Financial Stability of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
As many authors agree, defining financial stability is not easy (Gadanecz 
and Jayram, 2009, p. 365), taking into account the complex nature offinancial systems 
and the existence of complex connectionsbetween different sectors. No clear 
consensus exists on how to define financial stability, how to assess it or what policy 
measures to apply for its realization (Kakes et al., 2004, p. 4). Lai (2002, p. 1) defines 
financial stability as the ability of a financial system to resist a crisis for a given shock 
to the system. Houben et al. (2004, p. 11) and Schinasi (2004, p. 8, 10) see financial 
stability as the ability of a financial system to facilitate an efficient allocation of 
economic resources and the effectiveness of economic processes, such as wealth 
accumulation, economic growth, and ultimately social prosperity, to manage financial 
risks and to perform these functions, even when the system is affected by external 
shocks. In order to protect the financial system and ensure financial stability, Lai 
argues (2002) that it is necessary to remove the sources of instability (sources of risk 
and vulnerability) by reducing likelihood of financial crisis and to mitigate the costs 
of the crisis when they occur, and that all relevant parties (financial institutions and 
authorities) should be introduced with risks. According to the European Central Bank 
(ECB), the first line of defense against financial crisis consists of banks, insurance 
companies and other financial institutions. It is their duty to remain liquid and solvent, 
to check the creditworthiness of borrowers and in that way manage the risks they 
undertake. The second line of defense is made of measures taken by public authorities 
to mitigate the financial crisis. This leads to the conclusion that bank stability is a 
segment of financial stability, and given the significance of banks as financial 
institutions, the concept of banking stability is often identified with financial stability. 
Münür et al. (2008, p. 10) point out that banking stability is the most important 
segment of financial stability. Schwartz (1987) claims that financial stability cannot 
be achieved without banking stability, and also that financial crisis occurs when 
banking stability is threatened.Furthermore, Barth et al. (2001, p. 3) state that a stable 
banking system is an important component of a stable financial system. With the 
identification of the concepts of financial and banking stability in definitions, the 
notions of financial and banking crisis are often used, since the stability implies the 
absence of a crisis. 
There are many empirical studies that compared the stability of CBs and IBs, 
some of which are presented in the Table 1 below. 
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Table 1.  
An overview of empirical studies on the stability of conventional and Islamic 
banks 
 Sample Author  Methodology Research results 
B
ef
or
e 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
20 out of 57 
countries of OIC 
1993-2004 
Čihák and 
Hesse 
(2010) 
Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) 
regression 
- small IBs are more stable than 
small CBs 
- large CBs are more stable than 
large IBs 
B
ef
or
e 
an
d 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
141 countries 
1995-2007 
Beck et al. 
(2013) 
OLS regression - at the beginning of the crisis, 
IBs have better-quality assets6 
and a higher capitalization rate7 
than CBs 
20 countries 
1995-2010 
Pappas et 
al. (2014) 
Duration model, 
hazard rates 
- IBs have lower business risk 
 
24 countries of 
OIC 
1999-2009 
Abedifar et 
al. (2013) 
Regression – 
random effect 
- before the crisis small IBs are 
more stable than small CBs 
- during the crisis large CBs are 
more stable than large IBs 
17 IBs and 21 
CBsMalaysia 
2005-2010 
Rahim and 
Zakaria 
(2013) 
Panel data -during the crisis IBs are more 
stable than CBs 
 
D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
8 countries 
2007-2009 
Hasan and 
Dridi 
(2010) 
OLS regression - in the period of 2008-2009 IBs 
achieved twice higher credit 
growth and asset growth 
compared to CBs 
- in 2009 IBs suffer a more 
significant profitability decline 
Pakistan 
2008-2009 
Farooq and 
Zaheer 
(2015) 
OLS regression 
 
- CBs are more liable to panic 
reactions of depositors 
(withdrawal of bank deposits) 
- IBs’ lending is less susceptible 
to change of deposits 
(withdrawal of bank deposits) 
D
ur
in
g 
an
d 
af
te
r 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
11 CBs and 5 IBs 
The United Arab 
Emirates 
2008-2014 
El Massah 
and Al-
Sayed 
(2015) 
Financial ratio 
analysis (FRA) 
- CBs are more solvent, liquid 
and profitable 
and less risky than IBs 
 
Source: Authors' design 
 
Based on the overview of empirical studies on the stability of CBs and 
IBs, it can be noticed that the results differ due to the time and place of 
observation, the sample size, etc. Several authors (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Abedifar et al., 2013) differentiate between small and large banks, and conclude 
that before and during the crisis, small IBs were more stable than small CBs, 
                                                 
6The quality of bank assets is estimated according to the indicators of the institution's total assets, the share in 
total assets, institution profit and capital adequacy ratio 
7Capitalization or capital adequacy is a measure which represents the ratio of the regulatory capital to the 
risk-weighted assets of the bank 
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while the opposite is true for big banks. They argue that small IBs have a 
significantly lower risk of insolvency than large IBs. Beck et al. (2013) point out 
that at the beginning of the crisis, IBs had better-quality assets and a higher 
capitalization rate (compared to CBs), which increased their ability to absorb 
possible losses due to bad loans, which further implies greater security for 
depositors and lower business risks. Greater stability of IBs before and during the 
crisis is confirmed by Pappas et al. (2014) and Rahim and Zakaria (2013), who 
claim that the factors affecting the stability of IBs and CBs are similar, except for 
the diversification of income, which is exclusively a function of stability of CBs. 
Therefore, during the crisis when a bank income was subject to change, IBs 
proved to be more stable than CBs. Hasan and Dridi (2010) and Farooq and 
Zaheer (2015) confirm higher confidence in IBs during the crisis, stating that the 
factors of IBs’ business model helped in limiting the adverse impact of the crisis 
on the profitability of IBs in 2008, whereas the weakness in risk management 
practice of some IBs led to the decline in profitability in 2009.They emphasize 
the twice higher credit growth and asset growth of IBs during the crisis, which 
contributed to the financial stability of these banks. Furthermore, they stress out 
that rating agencies favor IBs, considering them less prone to business risks than 
CBs. 
Unlike the stated opinion, El Massah and Al-Sayed (2015), analyzing 
mostly the period before the crisis, give advantage to CBs regarding solvency, 
liquidity and profitability. The following assertions support their opinion: 
 CBs are basically large and strong (as opposed to IBs, which are 
generally smaller), and coped with the crisis more easily, 
 their tradition in banking business gives them an advantage of more than 
500 years over IBs, 
 CBs are able to impose their products through Islamic windows, getting 
the Western culture interested and closer to the East, 
 unlike IBs, which share their clients’ “destiny” and thus carried greater 
burden during the last crisis, CBs were protectedof the same with all 
available mechanisms and instruments. 
 
4.1.2. Efficiency of Conventional and Islamic Banks 
The literature differentiates between the two fundamental concepts of 
efficiency, technical and price efficiency. Farrell (1957) defines technical 
(production) efficiency, essentially, as the ratio between the results (outcomes, 
outputs) and investments (invested resources, inputs), and describes it as the 
ability of a company to obtain maximum outputs from available inputs, or in 
other words, the ability of a company to obtain given (desired) outputs with 
minimum inputs. On the other hand, he defines price efficiency (cost, allocative 
or Pareto efficiency) as the ability of a company to engage different inputs in 
their optimal ratio (combination) regarding their price and production technology. 
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According to this author, the perfect efficiency is achieved if both technical and 
price efficiency are achieved, and it is calledthetotal (economic) efficiency.  
Taking into account the specific features of IBs, numerous studies 
attempted to measure the efficiency of IBs, compare it to CBs and estimate 
efficiency before, during and after the crisis.  
An overview of the results of selected scientific researches is shown in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  
An overview of scientific studies on the efficiency of conventional and Islamic 
banks 
 Sample Author Methodology Research results 
B
ef
or
e 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
44 IBs and 37 CBs 
21 out of 57 countries 
of OIC 
1990-2005 
Bader et al. 
(2008) 
Data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) 
- no significant 
difference in cost, profit 
and revenue efficiency 
between CBs and IBs 
-IBs are more efficient in 
spending resources than 
in making profit 
21 countries of OIC 
1990-2005 
Mohamed 
et al. 
(2008) 
Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) 
- no significant 
difference in cost and 
profit efficiency between 
CBs and IBs 
82 banks:commercial, 
investment, IBs, etc. 
Bahrain, Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
1992-2000 
Al-Jarrah 
and 
Molyneux 
(2005) 
SFA - IBs achieve higher cost 
and profit efficiency than 
CBs and investment 
banks 
43 IBs  
21 Islamic countries 
1995-2001 
Hasan 
(2006) 
DEA 
Malmquist total 
factor productivity 
- IBs are less efficient 
than CBs 
 
Malaysia 
1996-2002 
Abdul-
Majid et al. 
(2011) 
SFA - IBs and Islamic 
windows are less cost-
efficient than CBs 
18 IBs 
1997-2000 
Yudistira 
(2003) 
DEA - the crisis of 1998-1999 
caused lowering of 
efficiency of IBs 
B
ef
or
e 
an
d 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
6 Arab countries 
2004-2007 
Johnes et 
al. (2009) 
DEA 
Malmquist 
productivity 
ratio analysis 
- IBs are less efficient 
than CBs 
18 countries with 
mostly Muslim 
population  
2004-2009 
Johnes et 
al. (2014) 
DEA, metafrontier 
Two stage approach 
examining 
determinants of 
efficiency 
- IBs are less efficient 
than CBs 
62 IBs 
16 countries of 
MENA (Middle East 
and North Africa) 
2004-2010 
Mghaieth 
and 
Khanchel 
(2015) 
SFA - IBs are more efficient 
in profit generating than 
in cost control 
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47 IBs 
2006-2009 
Said (2012) DEA - IBs’ efficiency is 
growing in 2006-2008, 
and is falling in 2009 
- small and medium-
sized IBs are more 
efficient than large IBs 
- during the crisis IBs 
outside the Middle East 
are more efficient than 
those in the Middle East 
IBs in the countries of 
MENA 
2006-2009 
Said (2013) DEA - credit and operational 
risk are negatively 
correlated to 
IBs'efficiency 
- liquidity risk 
insignificantly correlates 
with IB's efficiency 
D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
cr
is
is
 
15 countries 
2007-2009 
Rashwan 
(2010) 
Multivariate 
analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) 
- before the crisis IBs are 
more efficient and 
profitable than CBs 
-during the crisis CBs are 
more profitable and 
efficient than IBs 
Source: Authors' design 
 
In synthetizing the empirical results of the previous studies on CBs and 
IBs’ efficiency, a wide variety of opinions is noticeable. While some (Bader et 
al., 2008; Mohamed et al., 2008) consider that there is no significant difference 
between the efficiency of CBs and IBs, others think that IBs are more efficient 
than CBs (Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 2005), whereas the third suggest that CBs are 
more efficient than IBs (Hasan, 2006; Abdul-Majid et al., 2011; Yudistira, 2003). 
However, a closer analysis shows certain regularities. Looking at the period 
before the crises (smaller ones and the big one), it appears to be no considerable 
difference between CBs and IBs or slightly higher efficiency is noticeable in IBs’ 
operations. But approaching the period of the crisis, the efficiency of IBs is 
getting lower compared to CBs. Additionally, there is a certain consensus among 
the authors who observed the banks at the time of the crisis, and generally, proved 
the impact of the crisis on bank efficiency. 
Since 2004, all analyzed authors point out to greater efficiency of CBs 
over IBs, with the exception of two authors (Said, 2012; Rashwan, 2010), who 
give a certain advantage to IBs’ efficiency, but again, only in the period before 
the great financial crisis. Mghaieth and Khanchel (2015) present an interesting 
finding about the possible source of IBs' problems (2004-2010), and that is that 
IBs are more efficient in generating profit than in controlling costs. Furthermore, 
Said (2013) draws special attention to credit and operational risk, which is 
negatively correlated to the efficiency of IBs, underlining their inexperience in 
risk management as one of the reasons for theirpoor efficiency, which is 
particularly evident during the crisis. In contrast, Bader et al. (2008) suggest that 
IBs (1990-2005) are more efficient in spending resources than in generating 
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profit, which is a well-grounded opinion. Namely, IBs share losses with their 
clients and promote partnership and fairrisk distribution among bank 
stakeholders. 
 
4.2. Analysis of Market Power in the Banking Sector 
Taking into account different obstacles for banks entering the banking 
market, the number of participants and inhomogeneity of the goods, the market 
structure prevailing in the banking system is not perfect competition, but certainly 
imperfect competition and the nearest type of differentiated oligopoly (Cota, 
2002, p. 115).    
 
4.2.1. Regulation and the Financial Crisis in the Banking Sector: the 
Opinion of a Nobel Prize winner 
The United States of America (USA) have the longest history of 
regulation and supervision of banking operations in the world, introducing the 
regulation before the foundation of American Central Bank and the Federal 
Reserve System (FED) in 1913, with the Federal Act of Financial Supervision 
(1863) and the National Bank Act (1864). The development of regulation 
continues in the USA with the outbreak of the Great Depression (1929-1933), 
after which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established 
(Miletić, 2008, p. 45). As a response to the financial crisis then, a regulatory 
agreement was introduced, known as the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated 
investment and traditional banking. It was in force until 1999, when it was 
repealed, starting the period of deregulation of the financial system, which lasted 
until the first half of the 2000s (Vujčić, 2013). 
This period of deregulation (self-regulation), which essentially turned 
out to be a failure, can be related to the liberal theory of Adam Smith, who 
opposed state intervention and advocated the regulator known as the “invisible 
hand”. That financial liberalization had an influence on the occurrence of the 
crisis in the past can be seen in the research: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) conducted in 65 countries in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century, where 
financial liberalization significantly increased the probability of banking crisis; as 
well as in the research by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), where financial 
liberalization preceded the banking crisis in 70% of the observed critical 
episodes.  
It is considered that the banking and economic crisis, that first broke out 
in the USA in 2007 and spread to Europe in 2008, is among others, caused by 
insufficient regulation, which was scientifically proven by Jean Tirole, a French 
economist and the 2014 Nobel Prize winner for his analysis of market power and 
regulation. His research had a major role in investigating competitiveness and 
analyzing the ways to regulate the business of large companies. Tirole 
emphasized the importance of regulation in the statement: “The branches of 
industry like credit cards or Internet browsing are similar. They show a natural 
EKON. MISAO I PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXVI. (2017.) BR. 1. (241-263)                                      Lj. Cerović et al: COMPARATIVE... 
254 
tendency towards becoming a monopoly, which in itself is not bad as long as 
there is a possibility for more dynamic companies to take over the competition’s 
place, but the regulators should make this possible” (Agency for the Protection of 
Competition). 
Before Tirole published his first work on regulation, in the 1980s, the 
study of regulation was quite rare and it was mostly concerned about how the 
state could intervene and control prices in the two extreme market structures: 
monopoly and perfect competition. As opposed to this, Tirole began his research 
with the regulation of oligopoly and by analyzing various regulatory industries he 
laid a foundation for a new, deeper analysis of regulation and market power 
(Tirole, 2014). In the book “Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the 
Financial Crisis“, the second chapter of which was written by Tirole (2010, p. 12-
13), he described the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as follows: 
 weakly implemented regulation, especially in the USA, but in Europe as 
well, allowed for the assumption of risk of business entities, which is 
mostly borne by taxpayers and investors  
 market and ineffective regulation would not have had such an impact 
had the surplus liquidity not encouraged risky behavior. 
Emphasizing the importance of regulation, Tirole (2010, p. 48) as its 
primary reason sees the protection of small depositors, policyholders and 
investors in pension funds. If the country risks saving financial mediators, the 
given situation becomes a problem of the protection of taxpayers. Another reason 
for the need for regulation is the protection against systemic risk or domino effect 
which in banking system implies the overflow of risk from one bank to another, 
which has just happened in the recent financial crisis. 
Regulators should pay special attention to creating equal conditions for 
all market participants, so as not to violate the rules of a free market competition, 
a well-known dilemma which resulted inderegulation of the banking industry in 
the late 20th century (Pavlović, 2004, p. 61). 
Relating the concepts of banking deregulation and the recent financial 
crisis, Dewatripont and Tirole (2012, p. 238) state: “The policy of ignoring 
macroeconomic shocks contained in the Basel I and Basel II has led to too much 
intervention in recession and excessive leniency in the boom period”. 
In any case, in response to the crisis, regulation again becomes a 
necessary practice in all segments of the economy, especially in the banking 
sector. However, while economists and legislators before Tirole applied the same 
basic principles of regulation to all economy branches and the same, simple legal 
solutions for all markets, Tirole has shown that such a practice in some conditions 
gives good results, while in others it does more harm than good. Therefore, the 
principles of regulation should be carefully applied to each branch of industry, 
taking into account all of its peculiarities. Thanks to Tirole, regulatory and 
competition protection bodies have come up with a new set of tools that can serve 
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as a framework for adaptation of industries with a strong market, such as the 
banking sector. In that regard, arises the question of whether Basel II and Basel 
III are universal tools of regulation in the banking sector or they need to be 
adapted to the specific needs and business principles of CBs and IBs.  
 
4.2.2. The Impact of Regulation on Operations of Conventional and 
Islamic Banks 
A stable banking system is one of the basic requirements for economic 
growth and development, hence the necessity for its regulation, since it helps in 
achieving solvency, liquidity and efficiency of the banking system.  
The regulatory framework of banks is present at the international level 
since 1988, with the establishment of Basel I framework by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision. It is followed by Basel II in 2004, the purpose of which 
was to ensure financial stability by maintaining the level of risk to which each 
bank is exposed with capital requirements. In response to insufficient financial 
regulation and the resulting financial crisis, an idea was born about Basel III, 
which aimed at finding a solution for procyclicality of capital requirements and 
the quality of the capital. Among other things, it suggested that share capital be 
increased from 4% to 6% of risk-weighted assets, and the additional increase of 
capital requirements in the form of capital buffers in the amount of 2.5% in times 
of credit expansion as a counter-cyclical measure, and other protective layers for 
maintaining the same amount of the capital. The adjustment to new capital 
requirements will be carried out in stages for different aspects of the adjustment 
in the period from 2013 to 2019 (Kundid Novokmet, 2015, p. 160).  
Vujčić claims (2013) that the financial crisis, the costs of which were 
very high, nearly 20% of GDP at the global level, including the direct cost of 
bank rescue and the lost GDP, showed how faulty the deregulation of the banking 
system has been over the past twenty years. 
In this regard, the reforms of the regulatory framework are necessary, 
and they should: 
 increase the capital of banking institutions, as higher capitalization and 
lower indebtedness guarantee greater stability of banks 
 make big financial institutions in the system’s center or systemically 
important institutions even more resilient, requiring from them higher 
capital adequacy and stricter risk control 
 increase business transparency 
 provide a mechanism for solving problems in systematically important 
big institutions, i. e. a restructuring mechanism, with a minimum 
risk/cost for taxpayers 
 regulate other aspects of the financial system, directly and indirectly 
associated with banks, which are sometimes a direct substitute for 
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banking operations, and which have not been regulated so far or have 
been poorly regulated, such as shadow banking and derivative trade. 
Considering the abovementioned differences in business operations 
between CBs and IBs, the regulatory framework of these banks should be 
adjusted to their business principles, conditioned by economic, institutional and 
cultural environment.  
Alam (2013, p. 34) highlights three obstacles for the establishment of an 
effective legal and regulatory framework of Islamic financial institutions: 
 the lack of harmonization between Sharia principles underlying Islamic 
finance and the legal framework; 
 introduction of a just tax system, which would not punish the users of 
Islamic finance, because in Islamic finance transactions are related to 
activities of profit and loss, while in conventional finance transactions 
are tax-free, as these activities are defined as lending or borrowing    
 application of the laws of the Western world leads to anomalies, and are 
often contradictory to Sharia principles. 
Despite of Islamic finance being present on the global stage, Basel II and 
Basel III make no difference between CBs and IBs concerning the adaptation of 
regulatory measures to the specific characteristics of the financial system. Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) makes every effort to adapt Basel guidelines to 
Islamic business, although there is still a need for a standardized legal framework, 
which would regulate IBs’ operations. Ahmad and Hassan (2007) point out to this 
problem on the example of Bangladesh, arguing that IBs need a defined 
regulatory and supervisory framework for their successful business in accordance 
with Sharia. 
The studies presented below confirm the thesis that the bank regulation 
is necessary as it contributes to the financial security and the efficiency of banks. 
In a research on banks conducted in 72 countries in the period 1999-
2007, Barth et al. (2013) prove that restrictions and stricter limitations concerning 
bank activities are negatively related to bank’s efficiency, while higher capital 
regulation is positively related to bank’s efficiency. Furthermore, they claim that 
independent bodies which regulate the banks play a significant role in achieving 
the bank efficiency. Analyzing 70 IBs in 11 countries in the period of 2006-2010, 
Alam (2013) shows that regulations and stricter supervision of the banking 
system positively affect the technical efficiency of IBs, and similarly, tighter 
restrictions in the banking system lower the business risk of IBs.Chortareas et al. 
(2012) studied the dynamics between the key regulatory and supervisory policies 
and different aspects of bank efficiency on a sample of 22 EU countries over the 
period of 2000-2008. The results of their study show that stricter capital 
restrictions and official bank supervision can improve the bank’s efficiency. 
Moreover, the regulatory policy which restricts banking activities can result in a 
higher level of bank inefficiency. Observing the relation between the regulation 
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and the efficiency of banks on a sample of 46 African countries, Triki et al. 
(2013) conclude that tighter restrictions can have an adverse impact on the bank’s 
efficiency, while the availability of safety net8 positively affects the bank’s 
efficiency, although it also depends on the bank’s size and the degree of risk of 
banking operations. Small banks achieve lower efficiency in cases of increased 
capital requirements, and similarly, greater control and supervision of banks 
negatively affects efficiency of the banks with a lower level of risk assumption, 
regardless of the bank’s size. All presented results support the thesis that the bank 
regulation should be adjusted to the principles of banking operations with regard 
to its size and the business risk, conditioned by economic, institutional and 
cultural environment. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Unlike CBs, whose goal is to maximize profit and whose basic 
operations are related to the granting of loans, receiving loans and interventions 
in the payment system, IBs’ operations are based on Islamic laws, which strictly 
prohibit the use of interest. Due to this characteristic of Islamic banking, many 
were skeptical about the establishment of first Islamic banks, arguing that 
interest-free banking is not sustainable. Despite the skepticism, Islamic banking is 
one of the fastest growing financial industries at the global level. Interest-free 
banking does not imply banking without profit, but a stable and secure ethical 
business alternative. 
As a result of the relatively short history of Islamic banking and different 
business principles in relation to CBs, their comparison and analysis of their 
financial stability and efficiency have been the subject of many empirical studies, 
including this one.  
Although the results of previous empirical studies reveal certain 
inconsistencies when comparing the financial stability and efficiency of CBs and 
IBs, it is possible to identify certain trends and confirm the effect of the crisis on 
their financial stability and efficiency. When analyzing efficiency and financial 
stability in particular, before and at the time of the crisis, IBs show certain 
advantage over CBs. Greater stability, and even efficiency, is the result of the 
“purity” of their business based on commissions and fees (but not interest), 
aversion to risk (profit/loss sharing due to risk-sharing model), promotion of 
partnership (interest in business endeavors of the clients), religious principles 
(help and share their clients’ “destiny”), social responsibility (not funding the 
industry of alcohol, tobacco, prostitution, etc.) and so on. On the contrary, in the 
period after the crisis, CBs show higher financial stability and efficiency in 
business. It is probably on account of their long history in business and therefore 
clients’ higher confidence, a wider range of financial products offered to Western 
                                                 
8The safety net includes bank regulation, supervision (the lender of last resort, i.e. central bank) and a deposit 
insurance system. 
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and Eastern culture (Islamic windows), regulations adjusted to the specifics of the 
business of CBs (Basel I, II, III), etc. 
The regulation of financial markets and financial institutions, banks in 
particular, is an important precondition for financial stability and efficiency of the 
sector. Moreover, reduced regulation, deregulation or self-regulation is one of the 
main causes of the recent global economic crisis, as confirmed by Jean Tirole, the 
Nobel Prize winner for his analysis of market power and market regulation. The 
criticism of inadequate regulation and the responsibility of it in the recent crisis is 
in a way a criticism of liberalism and the liberal theory of Adam Smith, who 
opposed state intervention and advocated a regulator known as the “invisible 
hand” of the market. In any case, in response to the crisis, regulation again 
becomes an imperative of market organization, especially in the banking sector.  
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KOMPARATIVNA ANALIZA KONVENCIONALNOG I 
ISLAMSKOG BANKARSTVA: ZNAČAJ REGULACIJE 
TRŽIŠTA 
 
Sažetak 
Za razliku od konvencionalnih banaka, čiji je glavni cilj ostvariti što veći profit na 
kreditima, islamske banke pridržavaju se islamskog zakona (šerijata) koji strogo 
zabranjuje kamate. Zbog ove karakteristike islamskih banaka, mnogi su bili skeptični 
kad su se prve islamske banke otvorile, misleći da bankarstvo bez kamata ne može 
opstati. Usproks tom skepticizmu, islamske banke su među najbrže rastućim 
financijskim industrijama. Bankarstvo bez kamata ne znači bankarstvo bez profita, već 
jednu stabilniju i sigurniju etičku alternativu, jer umjesto kamata islamske banke 
uzimaju naknade i komisije za svoje usluge, sudjeluju u podjeli profita/gubitka svojih 
klijenata i zaštićene su ugovorima. Ovaj rad nastoji identificirati i analizirati sličnosti i 
razlike između konvencionalnih i islamskih banaka prije, za vrijeme i nakon krize. 
Prilikom skupljanja podataka posebna pažnja posvećena je fenomenu regulacije 
bankarskog sektora, isticanju prednosti regulacije nasuprot “nevidljivoj ruci” Adama 
Smitha, kao jednom od ključnih razloga za posljednju ekonomsku krizu. Na primjeru 
konvencionalnih i islamskih banaka, postaje jasno da svaku regulacijsku politiku treba 
pažljivo prilagoditi specifičnim uvjetima individualnih industrija, te da isti temeljni 
principi i jedinstvena pravna rješenja za sve sudionike tržišta neće donijeti željene 
rezultate, kako je to istaknuo nobelovac Jean Tirole. 
Ključne riječi: Konvencionalno vs. islamsko bankarstvo, financijska kriza, 
propisi, učinkovitost, stabilnost. 
JEL klasifikacija: G21, G01, G38 

